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In his inaugural address in 1993, President Clin-
ton posited a rhetorical link between communications
technology and American economic aspiration.
"Communications and commerce are global; invest-
ment is mobile; technology is almost magical; and
ambition for a better life is now universal."1 Less
than a month later, the President's "Vision of
Change for America" made a much more direct con-
nection between communications technology and the
economy. By auctioning Federal Communications
Commission ("FCC" or "Commission") licenses to
the highest bidder, the President wrote, the Treasury
could bring in $4.1 billion in four years.' Thus the
Administration pressed for legislation to authorize
FCC license auctions, a goal valued by conservative
economists since at least 1959 and by Republican ad-
ministrations since 1980.'
Congress responded in record time by crafting bi-
partisan legislation that has permitted the FCC to
obtain bids totalling more than $4.0 billion by licens-
ing new communications technologies through a
competitive bidding process - with by far the larg-
est results yet to come. The FCC, in turn, has em-
braced license auctions and has quickly established a
regulatory regime that will issue thousands of li-
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present personal communications services companies, cellular
companies, broadcasters, and others involved in competitive bid-
ding issues. The views expressed in this paper represent solely
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1 W.J. Clinton, This Is Our Time, Let Us Embrace It,
WASH. PosT, Jan. 21, 1993, at A26.
* Executive Office of the President, A Vision of Change for
America Feb. 17, 1993, at 83.
' Nobel laureate R. H. Coase proposed auctioning the right
to use radio frequencies in 1959. See R. H. Coase, The Federal
censes through competitive bidding in 1995.
Advocates of FCC auctions long have argued that
the marketplace can allocate spectrum licenses more
efficiently than can regulators. These advocates ar-
gue that, if left unregulated, the marketplace will
provide FCC licenses to those who will put them to
their utmost use. Under this view, raising revenue
should not be the main goal of effectuating auctions;
rather, the goal should be to use bidding as a mecha-
nism to ensure that licenses are awarded to those
who will use them most efficiently. Others, however,
have feared that cash-poor, but idea-rich entrepre-
neurs would be excluded from the process by an auc-
tion of FCC licenses to the highest bidder. "The
problem with cash auctions is that there is absolutely
no historical correlation between having useful ideas
and having cash," one witness testified before Con-
gress.4 "In fact, it is often pretty much the oppo-
site." 5 Still others have feared that the traditional
policy goals of fostering opportunities for small busi-
nesses and minority and women-controlled entities
could fall by the wayside in a pure auction
environment.
The legislation that authorized FCC license auc-
tions balances the tension between reaching the cur-
Communications Commission, 2 J.L. & EcoN. 1 (1959). The
basic concept of defining property rights in the spectrum was
advocated by economists as early as the 1920s. See Thomas W.
Hazlett, The Rationality of US. Regulation of the Broadcast
Spectrum, 33 J.L. & ECON. 133 (1990). The concept gained visi-
bility during the Reagan administration. See Mark S. Fowler, A
Marketplace Approach to Broadcast Regulation, 60 TEX. L.
REV. 207 (1982).
' Procedures to Improve the Allocation and Assignment of
the Electromagnetic Spectrum: Hearings on H.R. 707 Before the
House Subcomm. on Telecommunications and Finance, 103d
Cong., 1st Sess. 97 (1993) (testimony of Jack Pellici, Vice Presi-
dent, Oracle Data Publishing).
5 Id.
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rent budget target of more than ten billion dollars
and preserving opportunities for small businesses,
woman and minority-owned businesses, rural tele-
phone companies, broadcasters, and innovators who
pioneer new communications services or technolo-
gies. The FCC swiftly implemented this legislation
and has held three auctions to date. On December 5,
1994, the FCC began the process of auctioning more
than 2,000 licenses for broadband personal commu-
nications services ("PCS"), a next-generation digital
wireless telephony service that will compete with cel-
lular and, eventually, with wired local exchange
carriers.
This Article discusses the procedural shift from
the comparative hearings and lottery processes to po-
tentially lucrative license auctions that will have
ubiquitous implications for communications law and
policy. Part I describes the FCC's unprecedented de-
parture from the traditional usage of comparative
hearings and lotteries to award licenses to qualified
applicants. Part II examines the policy goals and
practical realities inherent in the competitive bidding
process and explains what this shift in licensing pro-
cedure does not accomplish. Part III provides an in-
depth look at 'the rules involved in the competitive
bidding process, including the sequence and struc-
ture of the auctions and the regulatory safeguards for
designated entities. Part IV concludes that the use of
competitive hearings to auction valuable spectrum
will have far-reaching effects throughout the entire
communications industry and will encourage the
most sincere and financially committed applicants.
I. BACKGROUND: A DRAMATIC DEPAR-
TURE FROM PAST PRACTICE
The Communications Act of 1934 ("1934 Act")
and the policies that developed from it embody a sig-
nificant number of societal goals. These goals include
the fostering of new telecommunications technolo-
gies; the maintenance of a system of free over-the-air
television and radio distribution; universal access to
basic telephone services; the promotion of public ac-
cess to diverse sources of information; the limiting of
6 47 U.S.C. § 309 (1988).
See In re Comparative Broadcast Hearings, Policy State-
ment, I F.C.C. 2d 393, 394-99 (1965) [hereinafter Policy State-
ment]; TV9, Inc. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 495 F.2d
929 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 986 (1974).
B Policy Statement, supra note 7, at 394-99.
B See Star Television, Inc. v. Federal Communications
Comm'n, 416 F.2d 1086, 1095 (D.C. Cir.) (Leventhal, J., dis-
senting), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 888 (1969).
foreign ownership and control of domestic communi-
cations facilities; and the facilitation of fair partici-
pation in democratic processes. Although legislators
and regulators can encourage licensees to effectuate
these goals, the ultimate success or failure of our
communications system depends upon the efforts of
the private entities that are licensed to provide com-
munications services to the public.
Because of both the dependence upon FCC licen-
sees to effectuate the goals of the 1934 Act and the
demand for scarce frequencies, the decisions sur-
rounding how to issue licenses and which applicants
to select to hold licenses have taken on predominant
importance. Licenses sought by more than one party
traditionally have been issued only after exhaustive
administrative hearings to determine which applicant
would better serve "the public interest, convenience
and necessity."6 This is known as the comparative
hearing process. For broadcast stations, the FCC ap-
plies standard criteria to determine which applicant
should be awarded a license.7 These factors have in-
cluded: diversification of media control, participation
in management by station owners, proposed program
service, past broadcast record, efficient spectrum use,
character, financial capability, and minority
ownership.8
Comparative hearings, however, have been criti-
cized heavily for imposing excessive delays and costs
on both the applicants and the public and for "re-
quiring hair-splitting speculative judgments about
which applicant is most qualified." 9 These criticisms
focus largely on services in which performance
promises of applicants are less important. For exam-
ple, difficulties in choosing among applicants were
noted in early cellular hearings prior to the imple-
mentation of lotteries. Streamlined hearing proce-
dures significantly improved the efficiency of the
comparative hearing process; however, the use of
hearings to award FCC licenses seldom has been
used outside of the area of broadcast services.
In 1981, Congress added another option to the
FCC's license selection methods by authorizing the
use of random selection (lotteries) to choose licen-
sees.1" In their relatively short lifespan, however, lot-
10 See 47 U.S.C. § 309(i) (1988 and Supp. 1 1994). Lotter-
ies have been used to issue licenses for cellular telephony, pag-
ing, low-power television, certain interactive video and data ser-
vice ("IVDS") markets, and wireless voice and data transmission
services. The FCC followed a standard lottery procedure
whereby applicants were assigned a ping-pong ball (or two, if a
minority preference was merited in a broadcast service) and ten-
tative selectees then were drawn from a bingo-type machine by
FCC officials. New computer programs for random selection
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teries proved problematic as a method of issuing li-
censes. Although lotteries have not suffered from the
decisional difficulties that have plagued the compara-
tive hearing process, they have tended to attract some
applicants that have little interest in building and
operating high-quality communications systems."
Disappointed applicants often resort to filing "peti-
tions to deny" against lottery winners-a practice
that often leads to the protracted administrative
hearings that are precisely the result lotteries were
intended to avoid. Additionally, lotteries are per-
ceived by many as fostering a subsequent "private
auction" administered by lottery winners.1
Consequently, competitive bidding was seen by
many both in Congress and at the FCC as the prom-
ising alternative that would remedy the defects of the
lottery system, without requiring the time and re-
sources demanded by the comparative hearing
process.
II. THE ADVENT OF COMPETITIVE
BIDDING
On August 10, 1993, Congress passed the Omni-
bus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 ("1993 Act"),
which added a new Section 3090) to the Communi-
cations Act. 8 Section 309(j) authorizes the Commis-
sion to issue licenses by means of competitive bid-
ding.1 4 Although the authority to issue licenses by
means of competitive bidding is a radical departure
from past methods of allocating FCC licenses, it is
crucial to bear in mind what this shift in procedure
does not accomplish.
First and most importantly, the use of auctions
will not alter the way the FCC manages the public
resource of the electromagnetic spectrum. The spec-
trum, as a whole, runs from audible sound to visible
light and only a relatively small portion of the spec-
trum (from 9 kilohertz to 300 gigahertz) is useful for
carrying electromagnetic signals with current tech-
nology. Currently, as a result of negotiations with
international allocation bodies and the executive
have largely supplanted the drama of the past lottery procedure.
"1 Kurt A. Wimmer, Netting Federal Revenues From Thin
Air; Issuing Spectrum Licenses by Auction, COMMUNICATIONS
LAWYER, Summer 1993, at 12. Thousands of cookie-cutter ap-
plications were filed by so-called "application mills," even for
tiny slivers of spectrum. In a proceeding to assign licenses in the
220-222 MHz band, for example, some 60,000 applications
were filed. Id.
12 For example, in one celebrated case, a winner for a cellu-
lar license for the Cape Cod area sold it to a regional Bell oper-
ating company for $41.5 million, even before actual construction
branch, the FCC decides which portion of the spec-
trum will be allocated to which communications ser-
vice. For example, television broadcasting occupies
402 megahertz ("MHz") in various locations of the
54-806 MHz band (some of which is shared with
land mobile services"8 ); FM radio occupies 20 MHz
in the 88-108 MHz band; cellular occupies 50 MHz
in the 824-849 and 869-894 MHz bands; licensed
broadband PCS has been allocated 120 MHz in the
1850-1990 MHz band. The FCC, along with the
executive branch and international bodies, will con-
tinue to decide where in the spectrum new services
should be placed.
Accordingly, applicants will bid for licenses to
provide specific services rather than for the. carte
blanche opportunity to implement some service of
their choice on a generic spectrum block. This means
that licensees will receive rights akin to a land-use
permit rather than a fee simple, even if the license is
obtained by auction at a price of millions of dollars.
Some auction advocates have urged a more radical
change, under which blocks of spectrum would be
auctioned generically and the winning bidder could
decide what service to institute. For example, a bid-
der could win a block of spectrum and start a new
television service, a competitive cellular service, or
some other service that had not been authorized by
the FCC. One variant on this approach, posited by
some FCC economists, would permit existing FCC
licensees to use their spectrum flexibly. A UHF tele-
vision station in a large city could, for example, use
its 6 MHz of spectrum to operate a cellular-like ser-
vice instead of a television service. The passage of
auction legislation does not accomplish either result,
but instead, merely permits the FCC to accomplish
the final stage of its analysis-which applicant
should hold a license-by using competitive bidding.
Consequently, FCC licensees who-win an auction
and who are licensed will have the same rights and
responsibilities as licensees who obtain licenses by
hearing or by lottery. Licensees who have obtained a
license through the auction process, will not "own"
the spectrum to which they are assigned; no licen-
of the cellular system ever had begun. James K. Glassman,
When There is No Such Thing as a Free License, WASH. POST,
Aug. 3, 1994, at Fl.
" Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No.
103-66, 107 Stat. 312 (1993) (codified, in pertinent part, at 47
U.S.C. § 3090) (Supp. 1994)).
14 Id. at 388.
"8 Land mobile services are two-way radio services in the




sees, regardless of how a license is issued, may ob-
tain a property right in publicly owned spectrum.16
These licensees are required to apply for license re-
newal after a term of years, exactly as current licen-
sees must do. In addition, they will remain subjectto
FCC disciplinary procedures, including liability for
fines, fdrfeitures, and license revocation. 1.
Second, the shift to competitive bidding will not
permit the FCC to use the expectation of revenue as
a determining factor in deciding how to allocate
spectrum among different services.' 8 The legislation
does not, for example, empower the FCC to allocate
spectrum only to lucrative commercial services (such
as cellular telephony) rather than to non-profit uses
of the spectrum (such as public broadcasting) in an
urge to balance the federal budget. The public inter-
est continues to be the touchstone. In fact, Section
309(j)(7)(A) of the Act prohibits the Commission
from considering "the expectation of Federal reve-
nues" in making its decisions.1 9 Furthermore, the
legislative history of the 1993 Act explicitly states
that the FCC should not permit the issue of revenue
potential to take precedence over the public interest:
The Committee intends the FCC to make its decisions
based on sound communications policy pursuant to the
Communications Act. The Commission is not a collection
agency of the U.S. Government, and should not ... be
influenced by budgetary considerations. This paragraph
t§309(j)(7)] is designed to insulate the FCC's communica-
tions policy decisions from budgetary pressures, and clari-
fies that important communications policy objectives
should not be sacrificed in the interest of maximizing rev-
enues from auctions.
20
The goals of serving the public interest and maxi-
mizing auction revenues for competing commercial
uses of the spectrum necessarily have some degree of
16 See 47 U.S.C. § 301 (1988).
Also, these licenses cannot be transferred or assigned on a
de jure or de facto basis without the FCC's prior consent. Id.
§ 310(d).
18 47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(A)(7) (1994).
19 Id.
20 H.R. REP. No. 111, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 258 (1993).
21 For example, because of benefits granted to minorities,
women, and small businesses, the recent IVDS auctions resulted
in bids of more than $200,000,000 that likely will translate into
"true" revenues of at least 20% less because of bidding discounts,
and may be depressed further by the likelihood that 80% of bid-
ders will qualify for installment payments. See generally 27
IVDS Winners Skip Payments; Licenses Will Be Reauctioned,
FCC REPORT, Aug. 25, 1994.
22 See In re Inquiry into Alleged Abuses* of the' Commis-
sion's Auction Processes by Applicants for Licenses in the Inter-
active Video and Data Services, Order, 9 FCC Red. 6846
(1994).
practical overlap. As a result, those services that are
demanded most highly by the public, and proposals
to structure those services to best serve the public,
almost by definition should raise a maximum
amount of auction revenue in the licensing process.
Third, the competitive bidding process that ulti-
mately will emerge will not be a straight "cash" auc-
tion, and it would be an oversimplification to con-
sider it to be so. For substantial numbers of licenses,
the FCC permits payments to be made over a dec-
ade-long period at low interest rates to minimize the
impact of competitive bidding on smaller businesses.
In addition, winning bids often do not reveal the true
amount the government will receive from bidders.2'
Furthermore, some bidders already have defaulted,
compelling ,the Commission to launch an investiga-
tion into possible bidder misconduct.22
Fourth, auctions will not become the exclusive
means for issuing FCC licenses. Broadcasters, for
example, have been exempted entirely from- license
auctions.2 The exclusion of broadcasters from auc-
tion requirements is based on the long-standing real-
ity that broadcast licensees already "pay" for their
use of'the spectrum by performing a plethora of
public interest programming requirements required
by Congress and the FCC.24 For example, broad-
casters must air programming responsive to issues of
concern to their community of license, and must
broadcast programming serving the informational
and educational needs of children. 25 Broadcasters
also must provide broadcast access to political candi-
dates and sell candidates airtime at discounted
rates.2  .
The exemption of broadcast licensees from auc-
tions will be particularly important for television
broadcasters that soon will be granted a second tele-
22 See 47 U.S.C. § 309(0)(2); H. REP. No. 103-213, 103d
Cong., 1st Sess. 481 (1993) ("over-the-air terrestrial radio and
television licenses" not subject to auctions). This broadcast ex-
emption was retained despite the objections of the Administra-
tion, which urged that all licenses, including those for broadcast
uses, be subject to auction. See Letter from Ronald H. Brown,
Secretary of Commerce, to Hon. Daniel K. Inouye, Chairman,
Subcomm. on Communications Comm. on Commerce, Science,
and Transportation (Mar. .15, 1993) (on file with the authors).
24 See Letter from Margita E. White, President, Association
for Maximum Service Television, Inc. to Hon. Ronald H.
Brown, Secretary of Commerce (Apr. 14, 1993) (on file with the
authors).
20 See generally 47 U.S.C. §§ 309(a) and (b) (Supp. IV
1993); see also Policies and Rules Concerning Children's Televi-
sion Programming, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 6 FCC
Red. 5093 (1991).
.26 47 U.S.C. § 315.
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vision channel to begin a phased nationwide transi-
tion to a system of high-definition or advanced televi-
sion ("ATV"). Under this program, each
broadcaster will use its new ATV channel to broad-
cast programming that will be decodable only by
ATV receivers while continuing programming for
standard receivers on its existing channel.2 7 When
ATV is accepted sufficiently by the marketplace,
which may not occur until at least fifteen years after
ATV is implemented, the broadcasters' standard op-
erations will cease and the old channel will be re-
turned to the FCC to be reallocated for new uses. 2 '
If these returned broadcast licenses are subject to
open auction, a uniform and complete transition to
an ATV system will be impossible.
The FCC will be able to continue to encourage
the development of new communications services and
technologies by issuing licenses outside the auction
process to innovators that pioneer new communica-
tions technologies and services. 2 Additionally, auc-
tions will not apply to the thousands of lesser-known
and generally uncontested FCC licenses that are is-
sued each year, for important but esoteric services
such as remote utility meter-reading and aeronauti-
cal telemetry.30
Fifth, the current legislation authorizes auctions
only for the initial licensing process and not for re-
newal applications." As a consequence, once a bid-
der obtains a license, the bidder will not be required
a See Advanced Television Systems and Their Impact upon
the Existing Television Broadcast Service, First Report and Or-
der, 5 FCC Rcd. 5627, 5628 (1990).
s8 See Advanced Television Systems and their Impact upon
the Existing Television Broadcast Service, Third Report and
Order and Third Further Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 7
FCC Red. 6924, 6925 (1992).
" See 47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(6)(A) (Supp. 1994).
30 47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(1), (2)(A) (Supp. 1994). The FCC
may conduct auctions only where there are mutually exclusive
applications for commercial services. Id. § 309(0)(1).
81 Id.
82 Id.
3. This article discusses the competitive bidding procedures
for broadband PCS only. Broadband PCS will apply advanced
digital technology to a wide variety of telecommunications de-
vices, ranging from tiny, portable telephones (similar to cellular
hand-held phones but at less cost and with greater clarity) to
high-capacity, high-speed wireless computers and data-transmis-
sion systems. The FCC has promulgated different rules for nar-
rowband PCS auctions. In re Implementation of Section 309(j)
of the Communications Act-Competitive Bidding, Third Re-
port and Order, 9 FCC Red. 2941 (1994).
" See In re Amendment of the Commission's Rules to Es-
tablish New Personal Communications Services, Memorandum
Opinion and Order, 9 FCC Red. 4957 (1994) [hereinafter PCS
Memorandum Opinion and Order]. The Commission also allo-
to bid for that license again once the term expires.8 2
III. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF
FCC'S AUCTION AUTHORITY AND
PREPARATION FOR PCS AUCTIONS
THE
THE
The debate on auction procedures, which will ap-
ply generically to scores of new services, has been
colored substantially by the nature of broadband
PCS, one of the first candidates for license auc-
tions.8 In a separate PCS rulemaking proceeding,
the FCC allocated 120 MHz of spectrum for li-
censed broadband PCS services and divided this
spectrum into six blocks, three 30 MHz spectrum
blocks and three 10 MHz spectrum blocks."' Two
30 MHz spectrum blocks will serve Major Trading
Areas ("MTAs"),3 5 while one 30 MHz spectrum
block and the three 10 MHz spectrum blocks will
serve Basic Trading Areas ("BTAs").3'
A. The Proposed PCS License Auction Process
1. Auction Sequence and Structure
The Commission will auction three different types
of PCS licenses through at least three separate
auctions."
The first auction, which began on December 5,
1994,88 was for the ninety-nine regional MTA 30
cated 20 MHz of spectrum for unlicensed PCS services.
" See id; see also In re Implementation of Section 309(j) of
the Communications Act-Competitive Bidding, Fifth Report
and Order, PP Dkt. No. 93-253 (July 15, 1994), paras. 33-34
[hereinafter Fifth Report and Order]. MTAs typically cover re-
gional areas. For example, the Boston-Providence MTA covers
portions of Massachusetts, Maine, New Hampshire and Rhode
Island containing approximately 9.5 million people. The Boston
MTA contains 14 basic trading areas ("BTAs") - Bangor,
Maine; Boston; Hyannis, Mass.; Keene, N.H.; Lebanon-Clare-
mont, N.H.; Lewiston-Auburn, Maine; Manchester-Nashua-
Concord, N.H.; Pittsfield, Mass.; Portland-Brunswick, Maine;
Presque Isle, Maine; Providence-Pawtucket-New Bedford,
Rhode Island/Mass.; Springfield-Holyoke, Mass.; Waterville-
Augusta, Maine; and Worcester-Fitchburg-Leominster, Maine.
The United States is divided into 51 MTAs for a total of 102
licenses; three of these licenses will be granted to pioneer prefer-
ence winners and thus will not be auctioned.
" BTAs cover smaller areas than MTAs, but typically are
larger than cellular licensing areas. PCS, Memorandum Opin-
ion and Order, supra note 34, para. 68 (1994). For example, the
Boston BTA, one of 14 BTAs in the Boston-Providence MTA,
contains about 4.1 million people.
8 See Fifth Report and Order, supra note 35.
s The FCC accepted 62 applicants for filing for this auc-
tion. However, only 32 applicants actually submitted payments
upfront. See 62 Applications Are Accepted to Participate in the
1995]
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MHz licenses. The Commission has designated these
licenses as the Block A and Block B licenses. The
second auction, scheduled to begin in April, 1995,
will be for the 493 Block C licenses reserved for "en-
trepreneurs"-i.e. small to mid-size businesses, in-
cluding businesses owned by minorities and women.
These licenses will be based on BTAs and will be
for 30 MHz of spectrum. The 493 Block F entrepre-
neurs' licenses for 10 MHz 6f'spectrum, 9 and the
986 10 MHz BTA licenses, for which all parties
will be eligible to bid, will be auctioned later in
1995.40
The Commission intends to hold simultaneous
multiple-round auctions." All licenses in a particu-
lar auction Will be open for bidding at the same
time. In the first auction, for example, a party could
bid at the same time on the adjacent New York and
Boston-Providence MTAs (or on other groupings of
licenses that make strategic sense to the bidder). Re-
garding the Block A and B auctions, the FCC now is
conducting two rounds of bidding each day, continu-
ing for a period of weeks, with bids accepted either
on-site or remotely, by telephone or electronic
bidding. 2
To ensure that auctions progress efficiently and
that only qualified bidders participate, the Commis-
sion adopted a package of bidding rules for the vari-
ous stages of the auction process. First, prior to the
auction, each bidder must file an FCC Form 175"1
short form application and, shortly afterward, pro-
vide an "upfront payment" of two cents per
megahertz per unit of population represented by the
licenses the bidder will seek in each round of the
auction ($0.02/MHz/pop)." For example, if the
bidder desires the flexibility to bid on three 30 MHz
December 5, 1994 Broadband PCS Auction, Public Notice (Nov.
10, 1994).
" The FCC reserved discretion to conduct separate simulta-
neous, multiple-round auctions for the C and F Blocks. See In re
Implementation of Section 3090) of the Communications
Act-Competitive Bidding, Memorandum Opinion and Order,
PP Dkt. No. 93-252 (Nov. 17, 1994) [hereinafter "Memoran-
duin Opinion and Order'1. On December 23, 1994, the FCC
released a public notice announcing that the C Block auctions
will begin in April, 1995. FCC Public Notice (Dec. 23, 1994).
40 Fifth Report and Order, supra note 35, paras. 36-39. In-
region cellular entities will be eligible to participate in bidding
for Block D and E licenses without eligibility restrictions.
" Id. para. 27.
," FCC Announces Auction Simulation And Bidding Proce-
dures For December 5th Broadband Auction, Public Notice
(Nov. 14, 1994).
48 Fifth Report and Order, supra note 35, para. 62.
" Id. para. 67. Bidders qualifying for the "entrepreneurs'
blocks," as discussed below, are entitled to submit upfront pay-
MTAs for Denver, Omaha and Wichita, the bidder
must submit an upfront payment of $4,032,000
($0.02 x 30 [MHz] x 6.72 million [people])."' Each
applicant then is assigned a unique bidder number.
Second, to commence the auction, the Commission
will set a "suggested minimum bid" for each license
between $0.05/MHz/pop and $.20/MHz/pop, but
will accept bids below that suggested price. 6 As an
example, a minimum bid for the Phoenix MTA (3.6
million pops) is between $5.4 million and $21.6
million.
Third, during the actual bidding and in accor-
dance with the Commission's "activity rules," each
bidder is required to be active in each round in order
to continue to be qualified to bid.' 7 Each bidding
"round" initially is likely to last one business day,
but the Commission retains the discretion to
lengthen or shorten the duration of the bidding
rounds.' Each auction has three "stages," each of
which could last for several days or even weeks.' 9
During Stage I, a bidder must bid in each round on
licenses encompassing one-third of the spectrum for
which it is eligible to bid.' 0 The auction moves from
Stage I to Stage II when, in each of three consecutive
rounds, the high bid has increased on ten percent or
less of the spectrum being auctioned." During Stage
II, a bidder must bid in each round on two-thirds of
the spectrum for which it is eligible to bid. 2 Stage
III will begin when, in each of three consecutive
rounds, the high bid has increased on five percent or
less of the spectrum being auctioned.' For Stage III,
the Commission will announce the activity level,
which will require a bidder to bid in each round on
95-100% of the spectrum for which it is eligible to
ments of only $0.015 per MHz per pop, a 25% discount. Id.
para. 67 n.45.
45 It may be advisable to pre-qualify for more spectrum than
an applicant actually intends to acquire because of eligibility
penalties that may arise under the "activity rules" discussed
infra.
48 Fifth Report and Order, supra note 35, para. 45.
' Id. para. 52. See also In re Implementation of Section
3090) of the Communications Act-Competitive Bidding,
Fourth Memorandum Opinion and Order, PP Dkt. No. 93-253,
para. 8 (Oct. 19, 1994) [hereinafter 'Fourth Memorandum Opin-
ion and Order].
41 Id. paras. 21-25.
" Id. para. 8. See also Fifth Report and Order, supra note
35, para 50 n.28.
58 Fifth Report and Order, supra note 35, para. 53.
81 Id.
82 Id. para. 53. The 30 MHz MTA auction moved to stage
two on December 15, 1994. Id.
88 Id. para. 54.
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bid."' In each case, the penalty for failing to bid ac-
tively is a reduction in the amount of spectrum for
which the applicant is eligible to bid."5 However,
each bidder has at least one automatic waiver for
each stage of the auction that can be submitted in
lieu of a bid without penalty. 50 Additionally, if a
bidder ends a round with the high bid, it is not re-
quired to submit a bid in the next round.57
Fourth, in determining the amount to bid, the
Commission will specify minimum "bid incre-
ments"-the percentage by which a new bid must be
increased above the previous round's high bid." The
minimum bid increment for Stage I of each auction
will be five percent of the high bid or $0.02/MHz/
pop.59 In Stage II, the minimum increment will be
two percent or $0.01/MHz/pop and in Stage III,
the minimum increment will be one percent or
$0.005/MHz/pop.6° The Commission may, how-
ever, vary these increments before or during the auc-
tion.61 Finally, to end the auction, bidding for all li-
censes will close when no acceptable bids are
received for any license."' Bidding for all licenses
will close simultaneously for the MTA auction."
However, a different rule may be announced for the
two BTA auctions, which will involve many more
licenses than the MTA auction.6'
In determining the method of payment, except in
the case of the "entrepreneurs' blocks," all winning
Fourth Memorandum Opinion and Order, supra note 47,
para. 14. Notwithstanding the activity rules, the Commission has
the discretion to shift the auction from one stage to the next,
based on a variety of factors. Id. para. 13.
" Fifth Report and Order, supra note 35, paras. 53-56. In
Stage I, the penalty is 3 MHz/pops in lost eligibility for each
MHz/pop below the minimum activity level; in Stage II, the
penalty is 1.5 MHz/pops for each MHz/pop below the activity
level; in Stage III, the penalty is I MHz/pop for each MHz pop
below the activity level. Id. For example, our bidder that quali-
fied by its upfront payment to bid on the Denver, Wichita and
Omaha MTAs-201 MHz/pops (30 MHz x 6.72
pops)-would be required to bid on 67 MHz/pops in each
Stage I round. If it bid on only Wichita in one round, which
would be a bid for 33.6 MHz/pops (30 MHz x 1.12 million
pops), 33.4 MHz/pops below the required activity level, it
would be penalized by losing eligibility to bid for 100.2 MHz/
pops in subsequent rounds. This penalty would prevent the bid-
der from bidding on all three licenses for which it qualified by
its upfront payment.
5' Id. para. 56. A "proactive waiver," which must be re-
quested by the bidder, will keep the auction open, even if there
are no new valid bids in a round. Fourth Memorandum Opinion
and Order, supra note 47, para. 15. An "automatic waiver" will
not keep the auction open if no other bidding activity has oc-
curred in that round. Id. The FCC has the discretion to change
the number and frequency of the waivers. Id. The Commission
also has the discretion to hold open an auction-even if there are
bidders are required to make a twenty percent
"down payment" within five business days of win-
ning the auction.6 5 The amount of the upfront pay-
ment is credited against the down payment." The
winner then must file an FCC Form 600 long-form
application within ten days after bidding. 7 Once the
FCC places the applications on public notice, inter-
ested parties may file petitions to deny."8 The re-
mainder of the bid will be due within ten days after
the license is granted."
The FCC imposes bid withdrawal and default
payments to ensure that only serious and interested
bidders will prevail in the auctions. A bidder who
withdraws a high bid during the course of the auc-
tion is required to pay the difference between its
withdrawn bid and the winning bid.70 If the winning
bid exceeds the withdrawn bid, no penalty is as-
sessed.71 However, if a winning bid is withdrawn af-
ter the close of the auction (or the winning bidder is
disqualified or unable to pay), a significant penalty
is assessed." Specifically, the defaulting bidder is re-
quired to pay 1) the difference between the default-
ing bid and the subsequent winning bid (assuming
that the subsequent winning bid is lower), and 2) an
additional penalty equal to three percent of the
lower of the defaulting bid or subsequent winning
bid.78 If the winning bidder defaults within five busi-
ness days after the close of the auction, the FCC may
no new acceptable bids or proactive waivers. Memorandum
Opinion and Order, supra note 39, para. 5.
57 Fifth Report and Order, supra note 35, para. 56.
51 Id. para. 41.
59 Id. para. 44.
60 Id.
41 Id.
82 Fifth Report and Order, supra note 35, para. 47. See also
Fourth Memorandum Opinion and Order, supra note 47, paras.
16-20.
13 See supra note 62.
" Fifth Report and Order, supra note 35, para. 47.
66 Id. paras. 72-74.
66 Id. paras. 65-74.
67 Id. para. 81. The FCC rules originally required winning
bidders to submit an FCC Form 401. However, the FCC re-
placed Form 401 with Form 600, effective Jan. 2, 1995. See In
re Implementation of Section 3(n) and 332 of the Communica-
tions Act, Third Report and Order, Gen. Dkt. No. 93-252, para.
414 (Sept. 23, 1994). See also Wireless Telecommunications Bu-
reau Announces Schedule for Implementation of FCC Form
600, Public Notice (Dec. 13, 1994).
68 Fifth Report and Order, supra note 35, para. 81.
60 Id. para. 73.
70 Id. para. 76.
'1 Id.
72 Id.
78 Fifth Report and Order, supra note 35, para. 34.
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offer the license to the next highest bidder-and to
other bidders in descending order of their bid
amounts-at the final bid level." The Commission
will reauction the license if the default or disqualifi-
cation occurs more than five business days after the
close of the auction.7
5
2. Regulatory Safeguards
The Commission also adopted a number of regu-
latory safeguards. Most importantly, bidders are re-
quired to disclose their participation in any bidding
consortia or joint bidding agreement.7 The rules
preclude bidders from cooperating with or discussing
their bidding strategy with other bidders who are not
members of such a consortium or agreement." All
bidding consortia and joint bidding agreements must
be disclosed in the FCC Form 175 short-form appli-
cation, which is filed prior to the auction.' 8 Further,
the rules permit bidders to amend this application to
reflect the formation of new consortia or changes in
ownership so long as these changes do not result in a
transfer of control of the applicant and the new part-
ners or parties have not applied to bid for the same
licenses.
7 9
However, the FCC does permit non-controlling,
attributable investors in an applicant to obtain own-
ership interests in, or to enter into a consortium with
another applicant in the same market.8 Such invest-
ment is acceptable provided that the entity certifies
that it will not communicate with any party concern-
ing the bidding strategies or bids of more than one
applicant and provided that the arrangement does
not result in a transfer of control.8" If members of a
bidding consortium are removed prior to or during
the auction, the consortium may continue to bid,
even if the removal of certain investors results in a
change in control of the bidder.82 The removed in-
vestors, however, are not permitted to bid on any li-
71 Id. para. 79.
I d. paras. 78-80.
e Id. para. 48. Antitrust law imposes additional limitations
on cooperative bidding strategies.
7 Id.
I d., para. 62.
' See Fourth Memorandum Opinion and Order, supra note
47, paras. 55-57. See also In re Implementation of Section 3090)
of the Communications Act - Competitive Bidding, Second
Memorandum Opinion and Order, PP Dkt. No. 93-253 (Aug.
15, 1994) [hereinafter Second Memorandum Opinion and
Order].
80 See Memorandum Opinion and Order, supra note 39, pa-
ras. 11-12.
censes for which the consortium has applied. 8
After the close of the auction, winning bidders
again must disclose, in detail, the terms of any part-
nership or consortium agreements to which they are
a party.8 This disclosure will occur when the win-
ning bidders file the FCC Form 600 application for
the license. 85 In addition, any licenses transferred
within three years after the initial license grant will
be subject to a requirement that the total considera-
tion received be disclosed to the Commission to per-
mit it to assess whether auctions have realized the
true market value of licenses.8
Finally, the FCC recognizes that certain entities
may have non-controlling ownership interests in two
or more bidders for licenses in the same market. If
two or more bidders in which one entity has a com-
mon investment acquire licenses in the same market,
the non-controlling investor potentially could have
interests that are inconsistent with the PCS spectrum
aggregation limits. In these situations, the FCC will
permit divestiture of non-controlling interests to
bring the investors into compliance with the spec-
trum aggregation limits, within ninety days of the
granting of the license.
87
3. Construction Deadlines
All 30 MHz broadband PCS licensees are re-
quired to construct facilities to provide coverage to
one-third of the population in their service area
within five years of the license grant and to two-
thirds of the population in the service area within
ten years. 8 All 10 MHz PCS licensees generally
must provide coverage to one-fourth of the popula-
tion in their service area within five years.89 PCS
licensees must file maps and other documentation
demonstrating compliance with the construction re-
quirements at the benchmark dates.90
81 See Id.
82 See Fourth Memorandum Opinion and Order, supra note
47, para. 57.
88 Id.
84 47 C.F.R. § 1.2107(d).
88 See supra note 67.
88 See Fifth Report and Order, supra note 35, paras. 88-89.
s See Fourth Memorandum Opinion and Order, supra note
47, paras. 53-54.
88 See PCS Memorandum Opinion and Order, supra note
34.




B. Protections for "Designated Entities"
In the legislation authorizing auctions, Congress
required the Commission to "ensure that small busi-
nesses, rural telephone companies, and businesses
owned by members of minority groups and women
are given the opportunity to participate in the provi-
sion of spectrum-based services."91 Accordingly, the
Commission crafted a package of preferences for
these "designated entities" and set aside two spec-
trum blocks for bids by small- and mid-sized compa-
nies? These preferences entitle certain bidders in
these blocks to bidding discounts9" and permit all
bidders to have some type of installment payment
plan option.94
1. Eligibility Issues
The Commission is concerned that bidders in the
entrepreneurs' blocks properly qualify for the special
protections crafted for those bidders. Thus the Com-
mission adopted strict eligibility tests for the various
categories of bidders.
a. Entrepreneurs' Blocks
The rules limit eligibility to bid in Blocks C and F
to entities with gross revenues of less than $125 mil-
lion for each of the last two calendar years and total
assets of less than $500 million at the time the appli-
cant files its short form application. Under the
Commission's rules, all annual revenues and assets
of all "affiliates" generally are counted when making
" Fifth Report and Order, supra. note 35, para. 93 (citing
47 U.S.C. § 309 (j)(4)(D)).
12 Id. para. 113.
" See id. paras. 130-33.
See id. paras. 135-39; see also In re Implementation of
Sections 309(j) of the Communications Act-Competitive Bid-
ding, Fifth Memorandum Opinion and Order, PP Dkt. No. 93-
253 (Nov. 23, 1994) [hereinafter Fifth Memorandum Opinion
and Order].
"' Fifth Memorandum Opinion and Order, supra note 94,
para. 17.
9' Id. The Rules define an "affiliate" as an entity or person
who controls or is controlled by the applicant either directly or
indirectly. Id. (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. § 24.720(1)). The af-
filiation and attribution rules are considered more fully in Part
II. The Commission has exempted Indian tribes and Alaskan
Native Corporations from the affiliate rules, but has created a
rebuttable presumption that revenues derived from regulated
gambling will be included in determining an applicant's eligibil-
ity. See id., paras. 42-44.
" See id. para. 30. The Commission also has created an ex-
emption to its affiliation rules for affiliates of certain minority
a size determination. However, in determining eli-
gibility for Blocks C and F, the rules generally do
not consider the personal net worth of a bidder's at-
tributable investors and affiliates.
9 7
b. Small Businesses
The rules provide additional benefits for "small
businesses," which include an entity that "together
with attributable investors and affiliates, has average
annual gross revenues for the three preceding years
of not in excess of $40 million."" The rules permit
small businesses to form consortia for the purpose of
bidding on PCS licenses, and building and operating
PCS systems." Under the rules, the assets of each
small business participating in the consortium are
not aggregated.'0 However, each member of the
consortium must satisfy the Commission's definition
of a "small business." 10'
c. Woman and Minority-Controlled Businesses
The Commission also provides special incentives
to encourage businesses owned and operated by
women and minorities to participate in providing
PCS. These incentives include bidding credits,
favorable down payment and bid payment terms,
and tax certificates.
10 2
There are two primary options for structuring
women and minority-controlled applicants: 1) the
25% Control Group Option; and 2) the 50.1% Con-
trol Group Option.10 3 Under the 25% Control
Group Option, woman or minority-controlled bid-
investors. See id. paras. 40-41.
98 Id., para. 53 (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. § 24.720(b)(1)).
Small business applicants generally must have a control group
satisfying the requirements of the 25% control group option,
which is discussed in the following section. Also exempted are
certain small, publicly-traded corporations. Id.
" 47 C.F.R. § 24.709(b)(3)); see also Fifth Memorandum
Opinion and Order, supra note 94, para. 53.
10 See supra note 99.
101 • See Fifth Memorandum Opinion and Order, supra note
94, para. 53.
102 See Fifth Report and Order, supra note 35, paras. 130-
47 (outlining rules for special bidding credits, favorable payment
terms, and tax certificates).
103 See Fifth Memorandum Opinion and Order, supra note
94, paras. 62-65. A small publicly-traded corporation with
widely-dispersed voting stock ownership is exempt from the con-
trol group requirement so long as it is not controlled or signifi-
cantly influenced by any entity or shareholder group holding a




ders must have a control group that holds at least
50.1% of the voting interest and 25% of the eq-
uity.'0 Within the control group, 15% of the equity
must be held by "qualifying" investors (small busi-
nesses, women or minorities).' However, the re-
maining 10% of the equity may be held by "non-
qualifying" investors (in the form of stock or op-
tions) that are members of the applicant's manage-
ment team, pre-existing investors of businesses in the
control group, or institutional investors.'0 6 The
"qualifying" investors can reduce their equity hold-
ings from 15% to 10% three years after the date the
license is granted.10 7 Woman and minority-owned
applicants selecting the 25% Control Group Option
can have non-qualifying passive investors outside the
control group that hold up to 25% of the equity and
25% of the voting stock.'0 8 The assets and revenues
of these passive investors are not counted in deter-
mining whether the applicant qualifies as an entre-
preneur and/or a small business.'
Under the 50.1% Control Group Option, woman
or minority-controlled bidders must have a control
group holding at least 50.1% of the voting interest
and 50.1% of the equity. Within the control group,
30% of the equity must be held by "qualifying" in-
vestors," 0 but the remaining 20% may be held by
certain "non-qualifying investors.""' The "qualify-
ing" investors can reduce their equity holdings from
30% to 20% three years after the date the license is
granted." 2 Woman and minority-controlled appli-
cants selecting the 50.1% Control Group Option may
have non-qualifying passive investors outside the
control group that hold up to 49.9% of the equity
and 25% of the voting stock."' The assets and reve-
10 Id. para. 64.
108 See id. The 15% of the equity may be held in the form of
options, provided that the options are exercisable at any time,
solely at the holder's discretion, and at a price less than or equal
to the current market valuation of the underlying shares. Id.
104 See id. If the control group consists of a single entity that
was operating and earning revenues for at least two years prior
to December 31, 1994, "qualifying" investors will be required to
hold only 10% of the applicant's equity from the outset. Id.
107 Fifth Memorandum Opinion and Order, supra note 94,
para. 66.
108 See id. para. 63.
109 See id. n.59. If two or more companies have formed a
joint venture or consortium to bid in the 30 MHz MTA broad-
band PCS auction, the Commission will treat them as a single
entity when such companies invest in the entrepreneurs' block
auction.
110 Id., para. 65. The 30% may be held in the form of op-
tions, provided that the options are exercisable at any time,
solely at the holder's discretion, and at a price less than or equal
to the current market valuation of the underlying shares. Id.
nues of these passive investors are not counted in de-
termining whether the applicant qualifies as an en-
trepreneur and/or a small business.
Non-qualifying investors also can acquire certain
non-equity interests in a woman or minority-con-
trolled bidder."" The Commission permits non-con-
trolling investors to obtain rights of first refusal,
supermajority voting rights and other "standard
terms" used to protect their investment." The Com-
mission cautioned, however, that these provisions
cannot be aggregated or varied in a manner that
would trigger a transfer of control of the applicant or
force the designated entity to sell its equity or lose
control."O
d. Rural Telephone Companies
The Commission created special rules that en-
courage the participation of rural telephone compa-
nies in PCS."1' Under the Commission's rules, a ru-
ral telephone company is permitted to "partition" a
BTA or MTA license, either with a consortium of
rural telephone companies or with another entity." 8
The rules do not permit rural telephone companies
to obtain bidding credits, favorable payment terms,
or tax certificates, unless the rural telephone com-
pany otherwise qualifies for these benefits under the
rules." 9
2. Affiliation Rules
The Commission's rules generally require the as-
sets of all affiliates to be included in small business
and entrepreneurs' block eligibility determinations.
"I Id. If the control group consists of a single entity that
was operating and earning revenues for at least two years prior
to December 31, 1994, "qualifying" investors are required to
hold only 20% of the applicant's equity. Id. The list of eligible
"non-qualifying" control group investors is the same for the
50.1% Control Group Option and the 25% Control Group Op-
tion. Id. paras. 64-65.
I's Id. para. 66.
111 Id. para. 65.
For example, the Commission will permit certain types
of management agreements between non-controlling investors (or
others) and entrepreneurs' block applicants. Fifth Memorandum
Opinion and Order, supra note 94, paras. 83-85.
1, Id. paras. 80-82.
116 Id.
117 In order to qualify as a "rural telephone company," an
entity must be a local exchange carrier and have fewer than
100,000 access lines, including all affiliates. Id. para. 105.
118 See Fifth Report and Order, supra note 35, para. 50.
"1 Id. para. 153.
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These rules define an "affiliates" as:
(1) All individuals and entities that directly or indirectly
control the applicant, and member of its control group, or
any other investor having an attributable interest in the
applicant; (2) any other entities also controlled by such
individual or enrity; (3) all entities over which the appli-
cant has direct control or indirect control through an in-
termediary; and (4) all other entities over which a mem-
ber of its control group or any other attributable investor
has direct or indirect control. 20
Thus, in order for a business to be an affiliate of an
enterprise or individual, it must have the power to
control or be subject to the control of the enterprise
or individual, whether directly or indirectly. In the
absence of such a power of control, there is no affili-
ation relationship.
Under the Commission's rules, affiliation may
arise under any number of circumstances in which it
is reasonable to infer a power of joint control. For
example, spouses, persons with an "identity of inter-
est" through common investments or familial rela-
tionship, companies with shared key employees,
common management, or common facilities generally
are regarded as "affiliates" under the Commission's
rules. 2
3. Control Group Rules
In order to qualify as a woman-owned, minority-
owned, or small business, the rules require the exis-
tence of a "control group" with a specified composi-
tion and with specified holdings in the enterprise.
122
The rules define a control group as a group of indi-
viduals or entities that possesses de jure control and
de facto control of an applicant or licensee. 1 8 Under
the Commission's rules, the entity's charters, bylaws,
agreements, and other official documents must pro-
vide that: (1) the control group members or the en-
tity unconditionally own 50.1% of the total voting in-
terests in a corporation; (2) they or the entity must
receive at least 50.1% of the annual distribution of
120 Fifth Memorandum Opinion and Order, supra note 94,
para. 39.
'31 See id. paras. 31-45.
122 See id. paras. 58-76 (revising the definition of woman
and minority-owned business to be consistent with the definition
used in other FCC contexts).
122 Fifth Report and Order, supra note 35, paras. 115, 164.
See also Fifth Memorandum Opinion and Order, supra note 94,
para. 77.
124 Fifth Memorandum Opinion and Order, supra note 94,
para. 77.
122 See id. paras. 78-82.
dividends; and (3) the stock held by the control
group must be given full proportional weight vis a
vis other outstanding stock (i.e., upon dissolution, the
stock must be redeemed at 100% of its value, and the
control group stockholders must enjoy full rights to
receive proportional dividends, profits, and regular
and liquidating distributions).12' Members of the
control group are treated as affiliates of the entity.12 5
4. Bidding Credits
Bidding credits are defined as a discount on the
bid price for the spectrum block." 6 Within the en-
trepreneurs' blocks, "small businesses"-those with
less than forty million dollars in gross reve-
nues-will receive ten percent bidding credits.1 2
Businesses owned by minorities and women will re-
ceive fifteen percent bidding credits, and small busi-
nesses owned by minorities and women will receive
twenty-five percent bidding credits.128 These credits
will reduce the amounts due to the Commission-a
minority-owned small business, for example, could
win at auction with a bid of ten million dollars and
be required to pay only $7.5 million for its license.12'
5. Installment Payments
Unlike all other winning bidders who are required
to pay in cash, entrepreneurs and designated entities
are permitted to pay over time.1" Entrepreneurial
companies with gross revenues in excess of $75 mil-
lion will be eligible for ten-year installment pay-
ments at an interest rate equal to ten-year treasury
notes, plus 3.5%."'3 Entrepreneurial companies with
gross revenues not exceeding $75 million, or with li-
censes in BTAs other than the largest fifty markets,
will be eligible for ten year installment payments at
a rate equal to ten year treasury notes, plus 2.5%,
with interest-only payments for the first year. 32
Small businesses are eligible for ten-year install-
ment payments at an interest rate equal to ten-year
"I See id. para. 97. For example, a bidder may bid $10 mil-
lion for a license. If that bidder is entitled to a 25% bidding




129 See id. paras. 97-100.
120 Fifth Memorandum Opinion and Order, supra note 94,
para. 101.
131 Id. paras. 101-03. See also Erratum, PP Dkt. No. 93-
253, at 2 Uune 10, 1995).
122 See supra note 131.
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Treasury notes plus 2.5%, with interest-only pay-
ments for the first two years.' 3 Businesses owned by
minorities and women are eligible for ten-year in-
stallment payments at an interest rate equal to ten-
year Treasury notes, with interest-only payments for
the first three years." 4 Small businesses owned by
minorities and women are eligible for ten-year in-
stallment payments at an interest rate equal to ten-
year Treasury notes, with interest-only payments for
the first six years.'3 5
6. Tax Certificates
Non-controlling investors in minority and woman-
owned businesses are entitled to tax certificates to
defer capital gains taxes realized on the sale of their
interests.' 36 Tax certificates also may be issued for
post auction transactions to entities that transfer or
assign their PCS licenses to woman or minority
owned entities.' Cellular licensees who divest their
cellular holdings to woman and minority-owned
companies in order to comply with the Commission's
cellular-PCS cross-ownership interests also are eligi-
ble for tax certificates.'3 8
The Commission imposes a one-year holding re-
quirement on the transfer or assignment of broad-
band PCS licenses by woman and minority-owned
businesses obtained through the use of tax certifi-
cates, unless the transfer is to another qualified wo-
man or minority-owned business.'39 Tax certificates
are granted only after the transaction is consum-
mated, but parties prospectively may request a de-
claratory ruling from the FCC regarding the appli-
cability of tax certificates to a specific transaction.
7. Restrictions
The Commission has adopted several restrictions
to ensure that entrepreneurs' licenses are broadly
distributed broadly and that the process is not subject
100 Fifth Memorandum Opinion and Order, supra note 94,
para. 103.
104 Id.
100 Fifth Memorandum Opinion and Order, supra note 94,
paras. 101-104.
108 Fifth Report and Order, supra note 35, para. 143. Tax
certificates were created to assist woman and minority-owned
enterprises in attracting capital by offering their investors
favorable tax benefits.
107 Id.
1"8 Id. para. 147.
109 Id. paras. 146-47.
140 See Fifth Memorandum Opinion and Order, supra note
94, para. 114.
to abuse. First, no single entity may obtain more
than ten percent of the available Block C and Block
F licenses (ninety-eight licenses). " " Second, all li-
censes in the entrepreneurs' blocks are subject to a
five-year holding and limited transfer period. Such
licenses must be held for three years before they may
be transferred. " During the two-year limited trans-
fer period, the entrepreneurs' block licenses may be
transferred to an entity that either holds entrepre-
neurs' block license or satisfies the entrepreneurs'
block criteria at the time of transfer. Third, if a bid-
der qualifying for installment payments transfers its
license at any point during the initial license term to
a non-qualifying entity, the remaining principal and-
any accruing interest, as well as the amount gained
by the use of a bidding credit, is due immediately.
4 2
B. Eligibility of Cellular Companies
One of the FCC's primary goals in licensing PCS
is to maximize the number of viable new wireless
providers in each market. 4 3 As a consequence, the
FCC limited the amount of PCS spectrum that any
entity can acquire in a single market. In addition,
the FCC has established more restrictive limits for
incumbent cellular providers who already have 25
MHz of cellular spectrum. " '
1. Aggregation of PCS Licenses
An entity cannot acquire an attributable interest
in more than 40 MHz of PCS spectrum in a single
market. 4 5 This will ensure that each market has at
least three different PCS licensees. Attributable in-
terests include general partnership interests, any ac-
tual means of working control, an officership or di-
rectorship, or five percent or more of the equity
(voting stock, non-voting stock, or limited partner-
ship interests). Options with rights of conversion to
equity interests and debt interests-including secur-
1' 47 C.F.R. §24.839(d). Licensees in Blocks C and F also
will be prohibited from selling more than 25% of the passive
equity (or 49.9% if it uses the 50.1% equity control group
model) of the licensee to a single investor if that sale would
cause the licensee to exceed the revenue or asset thresholds. Such
licensees, however, are permitted to grow beyond the thresholds
through equity investments by expanded service, business devel-
opment, revenue from operations, and other means. Id.
140 Fifth Memorandum Opinion and Order, supra note 94,
paras. 119-123.
14 PCS Memorandum Opinion and Order, supra note 34,
para. 103.
144 Id.
140 Id. para. 66.
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ity interests and convertible debt instruments-are
not attributable.
14 6
The Commission uses a multiplier to compute eq-
uity interests in PCS licensees, which ensures that
interests for attribution purposes correspond with
voting control.'4 7 For example, if A owns 30% of B,
and B owns 15% of the PCS licensee, A would have
a 4.5% non-attributable interest in the licensee. If A
owns 50% of B, A would have a 7.5% attributable
interest in the licensee. The Commission also deter-
mined that some non-equity interests-including cer-
tain joint marketing and management agree-
ments-should be deemed attributable for purposes




.Because cellular providers already have 25 MHz
of clear spectrum and a substantial headstart in
terms of providing service,' 49 the Commission re-
stricted the amount of PCS spectrum they can ac-
quire in their existing cellular service areas.'50 As a
general rule, an entity that has a twenty percent or
other attributable interest in a cellular provider can-
not acquire more than 10 MHz of PCS spectrum in
a service area with a ten percent or greater popula-
tion overlap, until January 1, 2000.151 After Janu-
ary 1, 2000, parties with attributable in-region cellu-
lar interests may acquire an additional 5 MHz of
PCS spectrum.' 52
The twenty percent attribution rule applies cumu-
latively to all parties with ownership interests in the
cellular licensee." 3 For example, if four partners in
a PCS applicant each own five percent of a cellular
provider serving over ten percent of the BTA popu-
lation, the PCS applicant would be deemed to have a
146 Id. paras. 117-22.
""' See In re Amendment to the Commission's Rules to Es-
tablish New Personal Communications Services in the 2 GHz
Band, Further Order on Reconsideration, Gen. Dkt. No. 90-314
(July 22, 1994), para. 3.
148 See Implementation of Sections 3(n) and 332 of the
Communications Act, Fourth Report and Order, GN Dkt. No.
93-252 (Nov. 18, 1994).
146 The 120 MHz of spectrum allocated for licensed PCS
service currently is occupied by microwave licensees. PCS licen-
sees will share spectrum with these licensees and eventually
many will have to pay to relocate incumbent microwave licen-
sees. Cellular operators, in contrast, have 25 MHz of clear spec-
trum per operator.
150 See PCS Memorandum Opinion and Order, supra note
34, paras. 16, 98, 103.
161 Id. paras. 17(f), 99. With the exception of the 20% own-
ership benchmark, the attribution rules are the same for the
twenty percent interest in the cellular licensee and
could acquire only 10 MHz of PCS spectrum. Con-
versely, if the four partners own five percent of four
different cellular licensees, each of which serves over
ten percent of the BTA population, the PCS bidder
would not be limited to only 10 MHz of PCS spec-
trum. The FCC expects that the cellular-PCS cross-
ownership rule will ensure that PCS licensees have a
strong incentive to compete against cellular licensees
in the same market.
5 4
3. Cellular Divestiture
There are two instances in which cellular licensees
will be able to acquire up to 40 MHz of PCS spec-
trum in their existing service areas on the condition
that they divest their overlapping cellular holdings.
First, if a party has a controlling interest in a cellu-
lar licensee that serves twenty percent or less of the
population in the PCS service area, it can acquire 40
MHz of PCS spectrum, provided that it pledges to
divest its overlapping cellular holdings within ninety
days of the PCS license grant.'5 5 Second, if a party
has less than a fifty percent voting interest in a cellu-
lar licensee, that party may acquire 40 MHz of
overlapping PCS spectrum, subject to that same di-
vestiture condition, as long as there is an unaffiliated
single holder of an interest of fifty percent or
more. 5 If the cellular licensee fails to certify its
compliance with the cellular-PCS cross-ownership
rules within ninety days of the PCS license grant,
the Commission can cancel the PCS license immedi-
ately and retain the payments tendered.' Cellular
licensees that divest their holdings to woman or mi-
nority owned companies will be entitled to tax
certificates.
PCS multiple ownership rules and the cellular-PCS cross-own-
ership rules. The FCC will use a multiplier for purposes of
computing ownership interests. As discussed below, the Commis-
sion has relaxed the attribution rules for designated entities and
will permit post-auction divestitures of cellular interests in cer-
tain situations. See id. paras 98-100.
165 Id. para. 17(k).
166 Id. para. 100.
154 See id. para. 113.
165 See id. paras. 141-45.
16 In re Amendment to the Commission's Rules to Establish
New Personal Communications Services, Third Memorandum
Opinion and Order, Gen. Dkt. No. 90-314 (Oct. 19, 1994),
para. 33.
1657 PCS Memorandum Opinion and Order, supra note 34,
para. 146. If a buyer cannot be secured, the cellular interest can
be divested to be an unaffiliated interim trustee for six months.
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4. Cellular Attribution Standards for Designated
Entities
To encourage small businesses, and woman and
minority-owned businesses to participate in PCS, the
Commission relaxed the cellular-PCS cross-owner-
ship rules for designated entities.158 Specifically, des-
ignated entities may hold up to a forty percent non-
controlling equity interest in a cellular licensee with-
out being subject to the cellular-PCS cross-owner-
ship restrictions.1 59 Additionally, any entity that has
a non-controlling investment in a woman or minor-
ity-controlled PCS licensee can hold up to a forty
percent interest in a cellular licensee without having
its cellular interests attributed. 160
IV. CONCLUSION
Auctions are certain to alter the dynamics of the
communications industry. Before auctions, an appli-
cant could file a lottery application with a minimal
investment of time and expertise. This process had
the benefit of expanding access to the FCC's licens-
'59 Id. para. 14.
159 Id.
ing process to a broader segment of the American
public. It had the detriment, however, of issuing
some extraordinarily valuable FCC licenses to appli-
cants who virtually had no expertise in telecommuni-
cations, nor any vision for implementing the service.
Under an auction procedure, a substantial amount of
effort must be expended at the outset by prospective
applicants to determine a vision for the service in
question, the market demand for the service, the
magnitude of a bid that would be rational for the
planned service and the particular applicant's access
to capital. As a result, it is likely that an auction
environment will discourage most insincere and less
financially committed applicants. Even among exper-
ienced communications companies, the cost of auc-
tions may alter business plans and provoke the estab-
lishment of partnerships or consortia. The official
establishment of a dollar value for FCC-regulated
spectrum undoubtedly will have a ripple effect on
the establishment of overall communications policy
even for services, including broadcasting, that will
not be subject to license auctions.
160 Id. para. 15
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